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Abstract
Migrants’ financial transfers have been estimated to be So-
malia’s largest source of revenue. The UK is believed to be
a significant source of these financial transfers to Somalia.
Drawing on preliminary ethnographic research in the UK
during 2004, this paper firstly presents some empirical ob-
servations on the dynamics of these movements of people
and money between the UK and Somalia and other parts
of the Horn of Africa. Secondly, it asks, in contexts of
forced migration, what is the relevance of the popular con-
cept of migrants’ financial transfers as part of a “transna-
tional household livelihood strategy”? Notions of
household, strategy, and what it means to send money in
such contexts are critically reviewed. The analysis con-
cludes with some challenges to common assumptions re-
garding refugees’ economic actions.
Résumé
Les transferts financiers d’immigrants sont considérés
comme étant la plus importante source de revenus en So-
malie, et le Royaume-Uni serait le principal responsable
de ces transferts. À partir de recherches ethnographiques
effectuées au Royaume-Uni en 2004, l’article s’attarde
d’abord à des observations empiriques sur la dynamique
des déplacements de personnes et d’argent entre le
Royaume-Uni et la Somalie ou d’autres parties de la
corne d’Afrique. Dans le contexte de l’immigration for-
cée, l’article aborde ensuite la question de la pertinence
du concept populaire de transferts financiers d’immi-
grants en tant que « stratégie transnationale des moyens
de subsistance des ménages ». Les notions de ménage, de
stratégie et du sens lié à l’acheminement de sommes mo-
nétaires dans un tel contexte sont examinées d’un point
de vue critique. L’analyse conclut par quelques remises
en question des hypothèses concernant les activités écono-
miques des réfugiés.
Introduction
W
e do not think of refugees as helping to keep a
country’s economy afloat. We do not think of
refugees as financing a telecommunications in-
dustry, providing for the basic needs of families abroad,
paying for weapons for militiamen, putting equipment in
hospitals. Yet these are all activities attributed to Somali
migrants through the sending of money to Somalia. Finan-
cial transfers by migrants have been estimated to be So-
malia’s largest source of external revenue, competing with
livestock exports and considerably larger than international
aid flows. Annual transfers from Somali migrants in the UK,
believed to be one of the largest sources of transfers, have
been estimated at around nine times the UK’s bilateral aid
to Somalia. The uses and impacts of these transfers in So-
malia and elsewhere in the Horn of Africa are complex, but
a significant proportion meet the daily needs of families.1
Migrants’ financial transfers to their country of origin
are  calculated  to be the most stable  and second-largest
capital inflow to developing countries, and are increasingly
highlighted in academic and policy research.2 However,
rather less attention has been paid to the dynamics of
migrants’ transfers to countries in conflict situations.3 This
paper highlights the fact that many Somalis recognized as
refugees have taken on roles that are more commonly
associated in the literature with economic migrants,
namely, the sending of financial transfers for spending and
investment in the country of origin. The first section pre-
sents some empirical observations on the movement of
people (with a range of motivations and statuses) from
Somalia to the UK, and the movement of money (shaped
by various factors) from migrants in the UK to Somalia and
the Horn of Africa. In the light of this evidence, the second
section reflects on how the dominant micro-level model of
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migration and migrants’ transfers as part of a “household
livelihood strategy” – a concept which pervades many un-
derstandings of transfers to conflict-affected countries –
helps and hinders our understandings of the UK-Somali
case. The third section reflects on common assumptions
regarding the economic actions of refugees.
The paper draws on fifteen in-depth  interviews  with
Somalis in the UK and conversations at community organi-
zations, at special events, in family settings, and with cus-
tomers of a money-transfer agency during 2004.
The Movement of People and Money
The Republic of Somalia was formed in 1960 from a British
and an Italian colony and collapsed in 1991.4 Warlordism
and inter-clan violence devastated parts of the country dur-
ing the 1990s. In the north the secession of Somaliland and
the regional administration of Puntland have provided rela-
tive stability for people devastated by violence. In parts of
central and southern Somalia there are non-state authorities
– clan elders, Islamic and regional groups, and even coali-
tions of business people – that provide a degree of stability,
many supported by their own militia. Efforts to re-establish
a functioning government based in the southern capital,
Mogadishu, continue at the time of writing. In the latest
Human Development Report, Somalia’s gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita is among the poorest in the world,
life expectancy is forty-seven years, primary school enrol-
ment is 14 per cent, and adult literacy is 18 per cent. Around
one-sixth of Somalis live abroad, the majority in neighbour-
ing countries, but some further afield.5
According to Sørensen, “Few source countries produce
only asylum seekers or economic migrants.”6 Historically,
there has been a range of political statuses and migration
channels among Somalis living in the UK. From the 1800s,
the British Merchant Navy recruited workers from the
Protectorate of Somaliland , and a few thousand ex-sailors
and their families were already living in the UK by the
1980s, along with small numbers of Somali students.7
When the civil war broke out in the north of Somalia in
1988, many more Somalis applied for family reunion in the
UK or claimed asylum. People have continued to seek
asylum fairly steadily since the beginning of the conflict. In
2003, Somalis made 10 per cent of asylum applications,
more than any other national group, and received 30 per-
cent of all the grants of settlement to refugees.8 Today, there
are Somali people who have become British citizens and
people at all stages of the asylum process, including people
who have had their asylum claim rejected but have not been
deported to Somalia.9 Some Somalis moved to the UK after
living in other rich countries, for example claiming asylum
after losing jobs and status in the Middle East countries
during the 1990s, or moving as EU citizens from the Neth-
erlands and Scandinavia since the late 1990s.10
There appear to be considerable incidences of remitting
across most political categories and migration  histories
mentioned above and across a variety of socio-economic
situations. The young men from Somaliland who first so-
journed as seamen in the UK rarely planned to stay, saving
and then sending or taking money to their families in
Somaliland, building their future there. Retired seamen
who did remain in the UK have sent money from redun-
dancy payments or state pensions to support relatives
abroad or sponsor their travel to the UK.11 Many people
who send money to Somalia came as refugees and are now
working in different types of employment; for example, one
man, now working for the local council, sends a regular
amount every month to two uncles, because they helped to
bring him up; he also sends money to twelve aunts, some-
thing small to one or two of them each month, and to two
uncles on his mother’s side on a quarterly basis (co-or-
dinating with two more uncles in the US who also sup-
port them). When we spoke, he had received an e-mail
from a school friend who needed money; he did not know
how this friend got hold of his e-mail address. “I had not
thought to send money to him, but now I will have to
include him this month.” At the weekend, his wife works
as a cleaner and he looks after the children as she also helps
support relatives in Somalia. Other people who make trans-
fers are reliant on state support; for example, a group of
sisters I met transfer $300 per month to their mother and a
sick brother in Somalia. Some of the sisters are on income
support and I asked one girl if she ever found it hard to
make the payments. She responded emphatically that they
have to send the money, that they work it out between them
if one of them does not have quite enough, saying, “She
can’t work, can she? She’s an old lady living with her sick
son . . . there’s no pension [in Somalia].” While it is much
less common for people on asylum support to remit money,
it does sometimes occur, particularly when people have
relatives in very difficult situations. Even some Somalis
born in the UK or who arrived at a young age sometimes
send money. For example, one girl in her twenties who
moved to the UK when ten years old sometimes sends
money to her aunt and her grandmother: “I’m not support-
ing them every month . . . so every six month I might just
dash something out, £100 or £200.” Amounts and regular-
ity of family transfers vary considerably: people may send
anything between $50 and $1,000 on a monthly basis, with
most transfers clustered at the lower end of this range,12 but
many migrants send less frequently, “what I can when I
can,” or in response to particular needs communicated by
the recipient.
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To  whom are financial transfers sent and for what?
Family members are the commonest important group of
recipients, with mothers and siblings featuring promi-
nently as recipients.13 However, other relationships can
also play a role. Family and business relationships often
merge, with relatives often running or co-owning busi-
nesses started by migrants or living in and looking after
property owned by a migrant. Many Somali import-ex-
port and construction businesses require financial trans-
fers from partners or investors in the UK or other
countries. There are also numerous migrant-supported
health and educational projects in Somalia, with clan and
community relationships playing a key role in mobilizing
funds. For example, one subclan group mobilizes funds
for a school in Somalia from the diaspora: each month,
group members in each country are responsible for send-
ing a certain amount to cover the total $6,000 monthly
running costs of the school. An e-mail list communicates
news about the project and mobilizes the group in re-
sponse to contingencies and to share gentle gossip and
jokes.14 Clan and political allegiances have also at times
mobilized funds for factional leaders and new political
administrations, e.g. via clan collections made by groups
of refugees to support militia – although people tend to
say that the days of collecting money for warlords are
over, that since the mid-1990s, people no longer trust the
warlords to protect their families’ interests. However, new
political formations and leaders in the north continue to
garner support from the diaspora, with attempts in recent
years to raise funds in the UK for Abdullahi Yusuf as
leader of Puntland (he has now been elected president of
the new Somali parliament) and with the resounding
verdict from the Foreign Minister of Somaliland, Edna
Aden: “The disapora has brought Somaliland to where it
is today.”15
These financial transfers, of varying amounts and regu-
larity, from a range of political categories of migrant across
a range of relationships, can be used for food, housing,
health, education, to maintain livelihoods during difficult
times, to extend livelihoods, to capitalize new income-gen-
erating activities, to invest in social networks and charitable
initiatives, for political support. In the context of limited
income-generating opportunities in Somalia, several So-
malis I interviewed described transfers as “like a monthly
salary” or “like social security” for recipients. Some inter-
viewees who send money said how they hoped the money is
used, but stressed that they sometimes have little control or
knowledge over actual uses by family members. This, and
some other aspects outlined above, do not easily fit with the
concept that familial financial transfers are a “transnational
household livelihood strategy.”
A “Household Livelihood Strategy”?
How does the literature on migration explain migrant trans-
fers? In the 1980s, in development economics, the definition
of “household” shifted from “shared residence” to “mutual
sustenance unit,” which might include people located in
different places as long as their principal obligations and
commitments are to that household. In this context, the
“new economics of migration” (NEM) focuses on the house-
hold as the main unit of analysis,and explains migration, at
the microeconomic level, as a way to diversify the house-
hold’s income portfolio in response to local constraints (in
labour, credit, insurance, or other markets).16 In this model,
migrants and non-migrants in the household share costs and
returns of migration, so anticipated remittances are key in
migration decisions, part of a “self-enforcing, cooperative,
contractual arrangement.”17 Effectively, migrant transfers
occur as part of a household livelihood strategy.
In more recent years some interesting conceptual themes
have been developing that are relevant to financial transfers
to countries undergoing conflict, including Horst’s explo-
ration of Al-Ali’s term “forced transnationalism” in the
context of Somali migrants in Minneapolis, Riak Akuei’s
research underlining the remittance “burdens” on Suda-
nese refugees, and Al-Ali, Black and Koser’s framework for
analyzing factors affecting the transnational engagement of
refugees based on research with Bosnian and Eritrean peo-
ple.18 However, the concept of migration and migrant
transfers as part of a “household livelihood strategy,” while
originally developed within an economic and functionalist
paradigm, has proved particularly powerful and pervasive
and is often invoked, both casually and carefully, to explain
remittance-sending by people from conflict-affected coun-
tries. How does this approach help and hinder our under-
standing of migrant transfers in general, including to
conflict-affected areas? My reflections focus on three areas:
the notion of “household,” the notion of “strategy,” and the
process of sending transfers.
Firstly, it is important to problematize the household
unit. In terms of composition, in Somalia “almost every
‘family’ unit encompasses three or more households, which
are interdependent in terms of the accumulation of re-
sources and their distribution.”19 Moreover, in conflicts,
household composition often changes radically, as family
members may be killed, or displaced, or may just lose each
other, and family members not strictly part of the “original”
household can take on key roles. Non-household links –
clanship, business, friendship, community, philanthropic
relationships – can also be the source of material and finan-
cial transfers. A woman who sent a fourteen-year-old niece
to Europe with a smuggler cited the poor education avail-
able in Somalia as the main reason, and then said: “Her
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parents are poor, but we, the relatives, can foot the expenses
involved . . . It is our hope that she will support her family.”20
Here, the girl’s migration was clearly viewed as a collective
investment, but a wider concept of family prevails. Gender,
age, and social relations also shape the household’s migra-
tion decisions.21 These relations can be dynamic: for exam-
ple, Somali families would traditionally send sons as
migrants, and when the conflict broke out, often families
were concerned to get their sons out of the country to avoid
the militia, but over time reportedly families increasingly
prefer to send daughters because they are seen as better at
“remembering their family” and sending money home.22
Secondly, it is also important to problematize the notion
of migration and transfers as part of a coherent strategy in
a given context. The new economics of migration was de-
veloped to explain contexts of labour migration. While
elements of force have certainly been uppermost in the
exodus from Somalia under conditions of conflict, it is
important to acknowledge that there are elements of choice
and force in both the most constrained flight from violence
and more work-motivated movements.23 As highlighted by
the concept of “human security,” the empirical boundaries
of countries “at peace” and countries “at war” can be more
blurred than we often think.
There are parts of the former Republic of Somalia that
are quite possibly more secure for a child growing up than
some of Brazil’s slums or Kenya’s refugee camps. This does
not belittle the human disaster of civil war, it rather testifies
to the existence of complex forms of insecurity and violence
across the world.
In all this, people are not only geographically, but also
socially, politically, and economically situated. In complex
and changing structural contexts, position is key: it can
determine whether people stay or go, and where they are
able to go. Migration to the UK is now dependent on the
mobilization of not-insubstantial financial resources, and
family assistance is common: to smuggle a person today
costs $4,000 to $10,000.24 According to a Somali aid worker
in Hargeisa, “Each person here would sell their soul to get
a visa – they would sell their house, their camels, their
possessions, their gold. They are happy to pay up to
US$10,000 to an agent and take a gamble to get someone
abroad.”25 Despite the extreme context of this case, it fits
with the NEM model as an example of a collective family
investment strategy based on the anticipation of financial
returns.
Moreover, the term “strategy” – defined as a long-term
plan to achieved a particular aim26 – implies a degree of
self-aware intent. This fails to capture the complexity of
migration from countries undergoing conflict. Some peo-
ple flee conflict and persecution in an unpremeditated
fashion (tactics?); many also leave as the result of a more
meditated decision as threats increase (strategy?). Often
migration is staged, beginning with a pretty desperate flight
to a neighbouring country, then a more meditated decision
to move to a richer country. Once people have escaped
immediate danger, they often feel the same concerns as
migrants from peaceful contexts: the wish to earn more
money, to find better opportunities, and so on. Van Hear
suggests that transnational connections between family
members in the three domains of refugee protection (coun-
try of origin, country of first asylum, country of resettle-
ment), signficant for many Somali families, represent
“enduring” if not official, “durable” solutions to displace-
ment.27 However, the spreading out of many families often
becomes a strategy – in the sense of a “long-term plan” –
only after migration has occurred. To say  that  migrant
transfers are part of a “migration strategy” in these complex
contexts smacks of ex post rationalization. Going back to
the NEM model, it remains unclear how much of a role
anticipated transfers actually play in prompting migration
from conflict-affected countries. In some cases, anticipated
remittances do clearly make a difference – this is illustrated
by the varying market prices of migration: “agents in
Mogadishu can charge double the price for smuggling So-
mali girls to Italy because the girls get jobs as housekeepers
and can start sending money home immediately.”28 What
is clear is that whether Somalis have been thinking ahead to
future transfers or not when moving to the UK, whether
leaving Somalia or other countries of residence for the UK
was “desperate” or “calculated” and supported by their
family or not, transfers often still take place.
Thirdly, what about the senders? The NEM approach
tends to normalize financial transfers as an integral part of
migration: migration is effectively predicated on antici-
pated economic returns. Most studies on remittances con-
duct research in the country of origin, with remittance-
receiving households; researchers are mainly interested in
the impact of remittances and tend to assume that, within
certain parameters, the sending of remittances occurs
pretty automatically in response to the needs of the receiv-
ing household. Thus the process of sending transfers is rarely
problematized and the impact of transfers on the lives of
senders is rarely considered. The source, patterns, and sus-
tainability of remittance transfers in general, and particu-
larly to countries undergoing conflict, remain under-
researched.
More detailed economic studies have conceptualized re-
mittance behaviour in four main ways.29 Firstly, altruism or
enlightened self-interest: concern for the family and invest-
ment in family relationships are socio-economically useful
if you go home. Secondly, self-interest: you might wish to
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cultivate good relations with your parents to secure your
inheritance, or you might prefer to invest your savings in
your home country and trust your family to handle this.
Thirdly, co-insurance: when things are bad at home, you
send them remittances; when things are bad in the host
country, you can go home. Fourthly, loan repayment: your
family financed your upbringing / education / migration
and you owe them. To some extent, we can recognize these
motivations to remit when examining the UK-Somali case.
However, this case also highlights that we should not focus
just on the dynamics between senders and recipients: the
material parameters of the migrant and the recipient also
shape the sending process, in this case particularly the
migrant’s income level, household composition in the UK,
and the income,  location, and security situation of  the
recipient, and whether they receive help from other family
members, can also shape financial transfers. Information,
or means of contact, would also appear to be an important
factor in shaping particularly family transfers: reportedly,
remittances to Hargeisa tripled in 1996 when telephone
services became widely available.30
The relevance of such parameters is particularly salient
where people are migrating from conflict-affected coun-
tries. Hyndman, researching displacement from Somalia
and humanitarian responses, points out that refugees do
not easily fit the “migrant transnational” template: “Post-
structuralist approaches which are attentive to the hyper-
mobility of capital in relation to the markedly restricted
movement of members from the displaced diaspora pose
a stark challenge to the often compelling analyses of some
‘travelling theorists’.” It is clear that “[d]ifferent social
groups have distinct relationships to this anyway differ-
entiated mobility: some people are more in charge of it
than others: some initiate flows and movement others
don’t;  some are more on the receiving-end of it than
others; some are effectively imprisoned by it.”31 This
analysis resonates with empirical evidence on the sending
of financial transfers by Somalis in the UK. Some are
indeed urbane “transnational entrepreneurs,” business-
minded people creatively deploying often earlier-accu-
mulated resources and their transnationalism to get on in
the world; others are vulnerable people struggling to ful-
fill, through great self-sacrifice, the obligation of keeping
family members from starvation. In the Netherlands, an-
ecdotal evidence suggested that newly arrived Somali
women who were seeking asylum, in many cases single
mothers, often remitted half of their asylum allowances
to help the rest of their family, with visible repercussions
on the nutrition and health of the children under their
immediate care in the host country. As a Somali health
worker put it, “[Their children] were eating bread and
jam too often.”32 For Somalis in the UK, transfers are often
a significant factor in their livelihoods, with reports of
people working two or three jobs on low wages and remit-
ting high proportions of their earnings.33 Some people
talk about not being able to make any savings in the UK
because of their commitments to family at home. There
are clear tensions between economic prospects in the host
country and support of relatives in Somalia. One forty-
year-old father, a government employee and home-
owner, told me his brother had phoned several times
during a recent drought for him to send money to pay for
the family’s livestock to be trucked to the next waterhole,
as the camels would not make it if they had to walk. After
a couple of such payments, he had wanted to ask if it was
really necessary, but could not really find the words to ask,
so he tried to say as little as possible. As he pointed out,
laughing, his brother would not appreciate being told that
he has a mortgage to pay. Many senders whose family
members depend on them for subsistence aspire one day
to send a lump sum to capitalize a sustainable income-
generating activity  for the family in Somalia, “so they
don’t need to bother you any more.” Some women use
rotating fund systems among clan and family members:
the strong social trust among participants and the com-
mitment to contribute to such a fund is respected and
understood by relatives in Somalia, and it is easier for
participants to put off requests than when their money is
in a bank and could easily be withdrawn. Through regular
contributions, each participant obtains a lump sum to
remit or to spend on a major purchase such as a car in the
UK.34
Interviewees express a strong sense of moral and social
obligation to remit: “It’s a must,” “You put yourself in their
shoes,” “In Somalia, you eat with your brother when he has
money;” and some also invoke a related sense of social
pressure to remit, from family and home community but
also within the diaspora. One interviewee told me that his
cousin has a good job in a shop in the UK but he was not
helping his mother in Somalia, so the interviewee, who was
sending her money, forced the cousin to speak to her on the
phone. Now the cousin sends her about $200 per month;
the interviewee physically accompanies him to the cash
point on payday and himself takes the cash directly to the
money transfer agency. These examples illustrate that the
process of sending transfers can be far from straightforward
for the migrant.
These are some of the issues raised by the UK-Somalia
case regarding the “transnational household livelihood
strategy approach” approach to understanding migrant
transfers. It is important to note that many of these issues
are general problems with the economic functionalism of
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the “new economics of migration” and apply in many other
contexts of migration and transfer, involving countries for-
mally at peace – although these problems are thrown into
particularly sharp relief by the UK-Somalia case.
Concluding Reflections
The financial transfers explored here represent the engage-
ment of Somali migrants in a transnational process, the
social, economic, and commercial dynamics of which chal-
lenge some common assumptions about the economic ac-
tions of refugees. Crisp has pointed to a tendency in the
literature to treat refugees as a separate case, in a way that
can exaggerate differences between refugees and other mi-
grant groups.35 A particularly important example of this has
been the fact that remittance sending is generally associated
with “economic migrants” rather than also being a recog-
nized activity undertaken by refugees. Research on the eco-
nomic actions of people categorized as refugees tends to
focus on those enacted within the host state, whether regard-
ing refugee livelihoods in countries of first asylum or refu-
gees’ fortunes in, for example, the UK labour market.
Refugees in the West are often assumed to be too isolated
and deprived to make financial transfers. While isolation
and deprivation certainly do form part of the experience of
many refugees in the UK, this does not preclude many
refugees saving and sharing income with family overseas;
moreover, even small amounts of money can be of consid-
erable significance by overseas standards, and particularly
so in countries wrought by conflict.
The debate on migration and asylum in Europe remains
hyperpoliticized and largely domestically focused or aid
focused. In the rich European countries that offer asylum
to some people from states undergoing conflict, the eco-
nomic actions and the elements of economic motivation of
those seeking asylum are too often either demonized or
denied. Yet refugees’ earnings and in some cases welfare
receipts may be remitted to provide support to families very
badly affected by conflict, often at considerable cost to the
refugee. The tentative evidence indicating that Somalis in
the UK might send per year nine times the amount of the
UK’s bilateral aid budget to Somalia is food for thought.
These financial transfers in no way substitute for just dis-
tribution of tax revenue or allocation of international aid
to poor people, and their complex effects are beyond the
scope of this article. It is worth remembering, however, that
beyond failed political regimes and beyond international
aid, people who have left countries affected by protracted
conflict and state collapse can be key actors in ongoing
transformations, of many types, that are occurring their
places of origin.
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